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 Abstract 
This paper addresses the democratically fundamental question of the inclusiveness of 
electorates and of its impact on citizens’ representation. While the literature has focussed on 
the congruence between voters and representatives, it has neglected congruence issues 
between citizens and representatives. The paper investigates comparatively this bias and 
source of newly disenfranchised citizens in a globalised society with increasing mobility. On 
the one hand, electoral laws vary in their inclusion or exclusion of expatriates (emigrants) 
and in the right to vote to non-national residents (immigrants). On the other hand, 
naturalisation laws vary in the maintenance of nationality for expatriates and in their inclusion 
of non-national residents. We illustrate levels of ―discrepancy‖ between electorate and 
citizenship in 22 OECD countries qualitatively, by presenting differences of electoral and 
nationality laws, and quantitatively, by comparing the size of citizenship with that of the 
electorate, and the national and resident populations. We show that shifts between political 
and national communities are primarily due to naturalisation laws and that electoral laws 
have so far been unable to correct for the discrepancy. 
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I.  Introduction 
Early studies of forming democratic citizenship have focussed on the progressive inclusion of 
increasingly large segments of the population in the electorate, what classical sociologists 
and political scientists called ―incorporation‖ or ―participation‖.
1
 With the full enfranchisement 
of the adult population and with the consolidation of national membership boundaries of 
political systems the analytical focus shifted toward Rokkan’s third threshold of 
democratisation, that is, ―representation‖. Since then, citizen–representative congruence has 
been at the heart of the empirical study of the quality of democratic representation, that is
 
the 
degree to which voters’ preferences are reflected among representatives.
2
 While early 
studies focused on measures of proportionality, in the last years empirical research has 
addressed the correspondence between ideological preferences at the electorate level and 
at the policy-makers level. In this regard, the literature has greatly improved the way in which 
the congruence between citizens and representatives is measured.
3
 
Yet, the analysis of congruence in representation has been conducted under the assumption 
that electorates by and large reflect citizens. This assumption could be safely made under 
circumstances of consolidated national boundaries of political systems. The equation 
between citizenship and electorate is however increasingly problematic in a globalising 
society with increasing geographical mobility. The definition of citizenship merely through 
political rights (the right to vote) is restrictive and does not take into account other elements 
of citizenship such as social rights (Marshall, 1963) and nationality (Brubaker, 1992). 
According to a more encompassing view, the electorate is only a subgroup within the 
citizenry. The assumption of correspondence between citizens and voters – which probably 
has never been entirely realistic – does certainly not apply to periods of elevated 
international mobility with life-long immigrants and emigrants transcending generations. The 
definition of citizenship and electorate under processes of supra-national integration and 
globalisation is today subject to ―restructuring‖ of boundaries very similar to that of other 
aspects of social and political life.
4
 
Under these conditions, the phrase ―no taxation without representation‖ acquires new scope. 
An increasing share of citizens living and working outside their countries lose political rights 
leading to a shift between citizenship and electorate. The claim this paper makes is that the 
measurement of citizen–representative congruence cannot be equated with voter–
representative congruence and that therefore issues of inclusion should be revisited. By 
                                                     
1
 Rokkan speaks of incorporation in his model of democratisation based on four thresholds (Rokkan, 1999). Dahl 
presents a similar model of the first wave of democratisation along the two dimensions of liberalisation and 
participation (Dahl, 1970). On these processes see also Bendix (1977). 
2
 Accountability has been understood as the other main dimension of democratic representation (see, for example, 
Mansbridge, 2003; see also Powell, 2000).  
3
 See Huber and Powell (1994), Powell (2000), Powell and Vanberg (2000), Blais and Bodet (2006), Golder and 
Stramski (2010). 
4
 For the most systematic treatment of the restructuring of the boundaries of political systems under pressure of 
supra-national integration see Bartolini (2005). 
2 — Caramani; Strijbis / Discrepant Electorates — I H S 
focussing on the quality of representation of electorates through representatives, the 
literature has forgotten issues of inclusiveness. It is this gap that the paper aims to fill. By 
claiming that this discrepancy has a deep impact on the quality of representation, we believe 
our argument has important implications for future studies on representation. It proposes that 
representation studies should clarify their understanding of citizenship and operationalise it 
accordingly, calling for measures of representation against different definitions of citizenship. 
It thus proposes to focus on the under-representation of entire social groups rather than on 
the distribution of voters’ preferences. In other words, we wish to shift the focus from 
representation to inclusion. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we elaborate on the notion of citizenship in relation 
to the electorate and representation. Second, we present a typology of electorates and the 
potential causes of variations among types. We show that ideal-typically the right to vote can 
be granted to (1) nationals (including expatriates), (2) residents (including non-nationals), or 
a combination of both, i.e. (3) resident nationals only or (4) all residents and nationals. Third, 
we show qualitatively variance in voting rights for non-national residents and national 
expatriates across 22 countries and, quantitatively, the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorates in these countries. The conclusion discusses normatively the relationship 
between national and political community, and makes a proposal to overcome the shift 
between citizenship and political rights. 
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II.  Citizenship, Electorates and Representation 
The issue of inclusion deals with the relationship between citizenship and electorate. While 
political rights (the electorate) constitute a crucial dimension of citizenship, the latter concept 
is broader. We define citizenship as the (potential) access to social rights that are granted to 
a group of people either through nationality (which applies to resident nationals and 
expatriates), or through residency (which applies to national and non-national residents) and, 
consequently, taxation duties. In the first case we speak of a membership principle (the 
group of nationals); in the second case we speak of a territorial principle (the group of 
residents). In both cases citizenship is attached to a number of rights (but also duties) which 
an individual can make use of or claim. This entails a definition of citizenship which does not 
necessarily correspond to that of the electorate. On the contrary, it is likely that it goes well 
beyond that of the electorate. For example, immigrants have access to social provisions and 
pay taxes, but do not enjoy political rights. Furthermore, expatriates may profit from welfare 
provisions (or can always claim them by returning to the country) without enjoying political 
rights. 
In Marshall’s (1963) classical formulation citizenship includes civic, political and social 
rights.
5
 Nationality has been the most important institution for the provision of citizenship 
rights.
6
 The reception of citizenship rights is, however, only partly dependent on nationality. 
In particular, civic rights are not bounded to nationality as they have developed towards 
human rights, which are increasingly granted on a global scale. Above all, social rights only 
partly depend on nationality as non-national residents in most Western countries get similar 
social provisions as national residents. The status of non-national residents, which have 
social but not political rights, has been described as ―denizenship‖ (Hammar, 1990). The 
concept of citizenship is therefore more encompassing than any operationalisation based on 
political rights. Political rights that define the electorate include, depending on the countries, 
a more or less wide proportion of citizens – as broadly defined above as the potential 
recipients of social rights either based on nationality or residency. There is therefore a 
varying discrepancy (across countries) between electorate and citizenship with some 
countries achieving a more or less complete coverage of the citizenship and some countries 
excluding a more or less large group. 
 
                                                     
5
 The nation-state has been, and largely continues to be, the locus of political and social rights. This applies to a 
lesser extent to civic rights, which have an application across national borders independent of nationality. This is 
the reason why – as reiterated further down – we focus on the national level as opposed to the local or supra-
national ones. 
6
 It has been granted on two principles: ethnicity and residency (Brubaker, 1992). Which principle is dominant 
depends on conceptions of nationhood (see also Koopmans et al., 2005). While civic conceptions of nationhood 
foster legal citizenship laws that give nationality dependent on residence (jus soli), nationality is according to an 
ethnic conception of nationhood provided dependent on descent (jus sanguinis) (see also Weil, 1984). 
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The distinction between citizenship and voting rights had little impact on voters–
representatives congruence during the peak of the nationalised state. This is because of the 
strong coincidence of the territorial boundaries (residency) and membership boundaries 
(nationality) during the peak of nationalisation. The closure of political, cultural, social, and to 
some degree economic boundaries along the unitary state (Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004) 
and the following cultural homogenisation (Gellner, 1983) has created a far-reaching 
congruence of rights and duties along the lines of the ―nation-state‖. Only recent trends of 
globalisation and European integration have resulted in a decoupling of boundaries along 
different functional and territorial dimensions. The decoupling of territorial from national 
boundaries has important consequences. The increase of migration within and between the 
developed and developing world has had the effect on a growing non-national resident 
population and on the size of the expatriate community, as well as on the size of the national 
community through increasing naturalisation rates. 
The decoupling also affects the composition of electorates. This is because electoral rights 
are usually connected to nationality, residency or both. Having the right to vote does not 
entirely depend on being a national, as in some countries it (also) depends on residence: 
whether or not expatriates should have the right to vote, and whether or not non-national 
residents (immigrants) should be allowed to vote. In the age of globalisation and 
technological progress the potential impact of the expatriates’ votes has become 
considerable with elections being potentially decided ―from abroad‖. Globalisation increases 
mobility, which affects the size of the expatriate community and strengthens the transnational 
bonds. Technological innovation has, among others, the effect that voting from abroad has 
become much easier. With electronic voting, space ceases being a decisive factor for the 
possibility to vote. As will be shown in the next section, electoral rights for expatriates vary 
considerably across countries and have a strong (potential) impact on the size and shape of 
the electorate. 
Electoral laws also vary concerning the resident population. Increasingly, countries differ in 
whether they grant voting rights to non-national residents. Although a trend towards electoral 
rights for non-national residents can so far mainly be observed at the local level, a few 
countries granted the right to vote in national elections to all residents.
7
 The effect the 
expansion of the electoral right to non-nationals has on the shape and size of the electorate 
depends on the size of the foreign community in a given country. The impact of the electoral 
rights to non-national residents on the variance in the electorates across countries depends 
on the migration flows and on naturalisation laws. All this increases the discrepancy between 
electorate and citizenship, as well as the extent to which this discrepancy varies across 
countries. According to our definition of citizenship it leads to newly disenfranchised groups, 
namely expatriates and immigrants. Examples of citizens who lost the right to vote back 
                                                     
7
 We limit our discussion to the right to vote at the national level and exclude provisions for political rights for non-
national residents at the local or regional level. We also exclude political rights in foreign countries due to supra-
national democratic bodies such as the European Parliament. 
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―home‖ but did not acquire it in the receiving country are numerous (for example, Turks in 
Germany), with some cases of explicit discouragement from both the sending and the 
receiving country.
8
 
We do not make the claim that inclusiveness necessarily affects the voter–representative 
relationship. The quality of representation is in principle independent from levels of 
inclusiveness.
9
 However, if the preferences of the emigrants and immigrants systematically 
differ from the national resident ones, whether these groups keep or receive the right to vote 
(through naturalisation or the electoral law) matters for the citizen–representative 
congruence. The claim this paper makes is that the analysis of the quality of representation 
can no longer afford to use the shortcut of equating citizenship with the electorate as 
increasingly large and permanent segments of the citizenship are excluded (rather than 
included) from access to political rights. It is this discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate – a problem of inclusion rather than representation – that this paper is concerned 
with. 
                                                     
8
 We deliberately renounce to discuss the exclusion of other social groups such as minors, prisoners and mentally ill 
persons for which provisions also widely vary across countries. 
9
 In theory, one can achieve perfect representation also when no citizen has the right vote. 
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III.  A Typology of Electorates 
III.1.  Four Types of Electorates 
In developed democracies the shape of the electorate can ideal-typically be summarised in 
four different types depending on whether or not the electoral right is given to non-national 
residents and/or expatriates. Similar to Bauböck (2005: 685), who distinguishes between 
four perspectives on ―expansive electoral rights‖, we distinguish four types of electorates: 
 The national-resident electorate includes nationals living in their home country. It 
excludes non-national immigrants and nationals who expatriated. It is the most 
restrictive type of electorate as, according to this ideal-type, only nationals living 
within the borders of ―their‖ state are entitled to vote. The closest empirical case of 
this type is Canada.
10
 
 The national electorate includes all nationals independently of whether they are 
resident in their ―homeland‖ or not. Voting rights are granted to nationals in the home 
countries and to nationals who emigrated abroad (expatriates). The principle here is 
purely based on membership. The closest empirical case of this type is Italy.
11
 
 The resident electorate includes all individuals who are resident in a given country 
independently of their nationality. Whether or not they are nationals, people living in 
a country have the right to vote. The principle here is purely territorial. This includes 
resident nationals and non-national immigrants. The closest empirical case of this 
type is New Zealand.
12
 
 The national and resident electorate includes all nationals (whether or not they live in 
the home country) as well as all residents (nationals and foreigners). These are the 
most inclusive electoral rules extending political rights not only to expatriates but 
also to non-national residents. Both membership and territory principles apply. The 
closest example of this type is Britain but, strictly speaking, there are no empirical 
cases.
13
 
                                                     
10
 For all these examples qualifications are in order. In Canada, for example, expatriates have the right to vote from 
abroad during the first five years after emigration. 
11
 Italy only recently introduced provisions for voting from abroad linked to registration in a consulate. Before, 
expatriates had to travel back to Italy to make use of their right to vote. 
12
 This is due to the very short period of time during which expatriates keep the right to vote from abroad (three 
years). The minimum requirement for qualifying to vote for residents is one year for non-nationals. 
13
 British nationals living abroad can vote as long as the first 15 years after expatriation. Furthermore, the category 
of ―residents‖ is very expansive as it includes all resident Commonwealth nationals (as well as Irish nationals). 
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These types of electorates are listed from the most restrictive to the most extensive. The two 
principles that apply are the membership and the territorial one. Their combination can be 
depicted as in Figure 1. Two types are pure in the sense that they are based on either 
territorial or membership principles, whereas two are mixed in the sense that they combine 
both principles. Below we will show the degree to which developed democracies fit into these 
ideal-types and, consequently, the degree to which they differ. We do not rely only on the 
qualitative description of the rules, but also present quantitative data on the actual shape and 
size of the electorates. For the moment being, we concentrate on types and sources of 
variation between countries. 
 
Figure 1: Four types of electorates in modern democracies 
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III.2.  Sources of Cross-Country Variation 
Electorates across countries vary because of differing provisions in two types of laws: first, 
the nationality law and, second, the electoral law. In addition, electorates vary because of 
differences in immigration and emigration rates. 
1. Nationality laws are relevant for variations in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy 
between citizenship and electorate, as nationality automatically gives access to political 
rights. Nationality laws affect membership. First, nationality laws determine the size of 
expatriate electorate (emigration) in that it rules on the maintenance of nationality after 
leaving the country (especially for further generations). Second, nationality (here, strictly 
speaking, naturalisation laws) determines the size of non-national resident communities 
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(immigrants) in that it rules on the access to nationality for resident immigrants (again also 
for further generations). Nationality laws affect the extent to which more or less large 
immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) nationality and consequently political rights. 
2. Electoral laws are relevant for variation in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy 
between citizenship and electorate, as they grant the right to vote. Electoral laws affect 
territoriality. First, electoral laws rule on the right to vote within the country for non-nationals. 
It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to residents who are not nationals 
(immigrants). Second, electoral laws rule on the right to vote outside the country for 
nationals. It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to nationals who are not 
resident (emigrants). Electoral laws affect the extent to which more or less large 
immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) political rights (independently of nationality). 
3. The interaction between migration rates and the two types of law is crucial, as the data in 
the quantitative part of the paper (next section) show. Figure 2 summarises the discussion. 
What appears to be crucial is the interaction between rates of immigration/emigration (and 
therefore the size of non-national resident groups and expatriates) on the one hand, and the 
legal framework which makes it possible to access the right to vote. As mentioned, there are 
two possibilities for getting the right to vote: nationality and electoral law. 
The groups of non-national residents and expatriates can be either small or large (we 
simplify for the sake of the argument). We ignore the possibility in which they are small as 
this does not affect the level of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate. If there are 
only very little numbers of immigrants and emigrants, citizenship and electorate correspond. 
They also correspond if immigrants are given the nationality since citizens acquire 
automatically the right to vote. Also when emigrants lose the nationality (and therefore claims 
to social rights) the two correspond.
14
 The interesting cases in the perspective of this paper 
are those in which one finds large numbers of either immigrants or emigrants or both. In this 
case we do not have a citizenship corresponding to the electorate as many nationals may 
not have the right to vote (because they live abroad) and many non-nationals living in the 
country may not have the right to vote. If there are large numbers of emigrants and/or 
immigrants, citizenship and electorate do not correspond unless the legal framework corrects 
for it (either through the nationality law or the electoral law).
15
 The last column of the table 
shows how the combination of legal provisions for the right to vote of emigrants and 
immigrants combine to determine the four types of electorates. 
                                                     
14
 Note that losing the nationality does not only depend on the country of origin but also on the host country which 
may require emigrants to give up their nationality of origin. 
15
 The figure simplifies a much more complicated story in which access to political rights for nationals living abroad 
is made difficult by registration requirements. This is discussed and illustrated below in the quantitative part of the 
analysis. 
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Figure 2: Access to political rights for non-national residents (immigrants) and national expatriates (emigrants) 
 
Groups 
 
Rates 
 
Political rights through legal framework 
 
Types of electorate 
  Nationality law  Electoral law  
           
    Nationality    Vote (*)  
           
  Large         
      Political rights  Vote (1)  
    No nationality       
Immigration 
(non-national 
residents) 
     No political rights  No vote (2)  
          
          
 Small  …    … (*)  
          
      Political rights  Vote (3)  
    Nationality       
      No political rights  No vote (4)  
  Large         
           
    No nationality    No vote (*)  
Emigration 
(national 
expatriates) 
          
          
          
 Small  …    … (*)  
           
Legend: Combination 1–4: Resident electorate (New Zealand); Combination 1–3: National and resident electorate (Britain); Combination 2–3: National electorate (Italy, Portugal); 
Combination 2–4: National-resident electorate (Canada); (*) Cases in which citizenship and electorate correspond. 
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IV.  Discrepant Electorates in 22 OECD Countries 
We divide the empirical analysis in two parts. First, qualitatively, we carry out the analysis of 
nationality laws and electoral laws, and how they empirically vary across countries. Second, 
quantitatively, we propose an analysis of the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate 
based on the size of expatriate and non-national resident groups. 
IV.1.  Qualitative Analysis: Naturalisation Laws and Electoral Laws 
As we have seen above, it is possible to acquire voting rights either through nationality laws 
or through electoral laws. The first includes individuals in the membership of nationals, or 
excludes them. The second includes individuals resident in a territory (non-national citizens) 
and those resident abroad, or excludes them. What appears from the comparative 
information collected for 22 OECD countries presented in Table 1 is that countries vary 
above all in regard to nationality laws and hardly vary in regard to electoral laws. 
On the one hand, in only very few countries do electoral laws allow non-national residents 
(immigrants) to vote in national or federal elections. The only such case is New Zealand. 
There are other two cases in which specific types of ―non-nationals‖ are allowed to vote: first, 
Brazilians in Portugal under a number of special conditions; second, British nationals in 
Ireland; third, Commonwealth and Irish nationals in the United Kingdom. In no other country 
in the sample considered here can resident foreigners participate in national or federal 
elections. On the other hand, almost all countries allow their national expatriates (emigrants) 
to maintain the right to vote. As we see from Table 1 most countries allow their nationals 
abroad to keep the right to vote either indeterminately or for a more or less long period of 
time. In this regard, the variation is quite large. Out of the 22 countries, 15 allow expatriates 
to maintain the right to vote without time limits. There is one country that does not allow its 
nationals to vote if living abroad: Ireland.
16
 Considering the size of Irish emigration to the 
United States, granting emigrants the right to vote would mean that the election could be 
decided overseas. Among the remaining six countries, there are three that allow to keep the 
right to vote for a short period of time (New Zealand for three years, Canada for five and 
Australia for six). Portugal allows emigrants to vote in national elections for up to ten years 
after expatriation. The impact of this variation on the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate obviously depends on the size of both immigration and emigration. We will deal 
with the interaction between laws and rates of migrations in the quantitative analysis. 
  
                                                     
16
 The exception being diplomats and military. 
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Table 1: Electoral rights at the national level for non-national residents (immigrants) 
and national expatriates (emigrants) in 22 OECD countries 
 
Country 
Electoral rights for 
national expatriates 
(emigrants)
1
 
Electoral 
rights for 
non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
Access to 
nationality 
(MIPEX 
Index, 
0–100) 
Share of 
foreign-
born 
residents 
(2000/01) 
     
Australia For the first six years No N.a. 23.1 
Austria Yes No 22 10.5 
Belgium Yes No 71 10.3 
Canada For the first five 
years 
No 67 18.1 
Czech Republic Yes No 50 4.2 
Denmark Yes No 33 5.8 
Finland Yes No 44 2.6 
Germany For the first 25 years No 38 12.5 
Iceland Yes No N.a. N.a. 
Ireland No
2
 Partly
4
 62 8.7 
Italy Yes No 33 2.5 
Japan Yes No N.a. N.a. 
Luxembourg Yes No 45 33.2 
Netherlands Yes No 51 10.1 
New Zealand For the first three 
years 
Yes N.a. 17.2 
Norway Yes No 39 6.8 
Portugal For the first ten 
years
3
 
Partly
4
 69 5.1 
Spain Yes No 41 5.3 
Sweden Yes No 71 11.5 
Switzerland Yes No 44 21.9 
United Kingdom For the first 15 years Partly
4
 62 7.9 
United States Yes No N.a. 11.0 
     
 
Notes: 
 
1) In most countries, expatriates usually need to register as voters (Green, 2007). 
2) Only diplomats and military. 
3) Not more than 15 years in the EU or a Portuguese speaking country. Additionally, they have to 
stay at least 30 days in Portugal in the last five years, and speak Portuguese (Costa Lobo, 
2007: 84). 
4) In the case of Ireland British residents are also allowed to vote for Dáil elections. In Portugal, 
Brazilian citizens with special rights acquire voting rights, and in the United Kingdom, these 
rights include Commonwealth and Irish citizens. 
N.a. Information not available. 
 
Sources: Data on expatriate voting rights from IDEA (2007); electoral rights for immigrants and 
access to nationality from Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007); data on foreign born 
population from OECD (2006). 
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Contrary to electoral laws, nationality laws vary a great deal across countries in the extent to 
which they give access to nationality and, consequently, voting rights. Nationality laws are 
the set of rules through which the conditions for the gain or loss of nationality are set. For 
clarity we will speak in general of ―nationality law‖ to indicate the extent to which emigrants 
maintain their nationality of origin, and of ―naturalisation law‖ to indicate the extent to which 
immigrants acquire the new nationality. Most countries do not deprive emigrants of their 
nationality even after generations – some do for the third generation. Nationality laws 
therefore do not vary a great deal in regard to national expatriates (emigrants).
17
 They do 
vary, however, a great deal in regard to the naturalisation of non-national resident citizens. 
While naturalisation laws based on jus sanguinis are very closed towards ethnically distinct 
immigrants – and therefore generate large numbers of non-national residents – countries 
based on jus soli tend to be much more open in the way they naturalise the majority of their 
immigrant residents. Good examples of ―hard-to-get‖ naturalisation are Austria and 
Switzerland. The third column in Table 1, however, points to other countries for which 
naturalisation for non-national residents is difficult. Using the MIPEX index that 
operationalise the easiness with which single nationalities can be acquired, we see that 
besides Austria and Switzerland, also Germany, Denmark and Finland (as well as Italy and 
Spain) have naturalisation laws unfavourable to the incorporation of non-nationals in the 
electorate through the nationality law. 
The discussion so far leads us to conclude that electoral laws vary little with the exception of 
Ireland (as far as the electoral law on emigrants is concerned) and New Zealand (as far as 
the electoral law concerning immigrants is concerned). In regard to the acquisition of 
nationality and therefore the automatic access to political rights, again we find little variation 
concerning nationality law (emigrants). However, there is a large variation in naturalisation 
laws (immigrants). This information leads us to formulate the hypothesis that differences in 
the levels of discrepancy (between citizenship and electorates) are primarily caused by 
variations in naturalisation laws, and amplified by a large influx of immigrants. 
IV.2.  Quantitative Analysis: Size of Emigration and Immigration 
In this section we proceed in three steps. First, we describe citizenship in 21 countries.
18
 
Then, we describe electorates. Finally, we describe the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate and interpret variations in the levels of discrepancy with reference to (1) nationality 
and electoral laws (mentioned above) and (2) rates of immigration and emigration. 
                                                     
17
 Regulations regarding the maintenance of nationality for expatriates is made more complicated by conditions set 
by the receiving country and the possibility to have a double nationality. A good example is the impact on the 
German naturalisation law on the propensity of Turkish immigrants to resign from their former nationality before 
the change of the German naturalization law in 2002. 
18
 We must unfortunately exclude New Zealand from this part of the analysis because of unreliable information. 
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The data on which we can draw are official register data from national statistical offices and 
from the OECD. Census data contain the number of residents and the number of non-
national residents by age cohorts. The size of the electorates has been derived from data on 
electoral results. The data on expatriate communities had, in several cases, to be estimated. 
The most valid (and in many cases only) estimates on the size of the expatriate community 
have been calculated by the OECD for the year 2000 (2001 for Italy). They only include the 
number of expatriates in other OECD countries and should therefore be interpreted as the 
lower bound of the real number. The data further estimate the number of expatriates at the 
age of 15 or older and do therefore slightly overestimate the share of expatriates at voting 
age. 
Table 2: Citizenship in 21 OECD countries 
 
Country 
Adult 
citizenship 
Non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
National 
expatriates 
(emigrants) 
Resident 
nationals 
Total 
 (absolute)             (as % of citizens) 
      
Japan 104,353,921 1.1 0.6 98.4 100.0 
Czech Republic 8,413,143 1.8 2.7 95.6 100.0 
Canada 25,326,533 0.8 4.1 95.1 100.0 
Spain 34,355,265 3.8 2.5 93.7 100.0 
Australia 14,882,361 4.9 1.8 93.3 100.0 
Norway 3,564,658 4.1 3.4 92.4 100.0 
Finland 4,335,367 1.8 6.1 92.1 100.0 
United States 210,088,689 7.6 0.4 92.0 100.0 
Sweden 7,151,617 5.4 2.9 91.7 100.0 
Denmark 4,361,200 4.4 4.0 91.6 100.0 
Netherlands 13,071,282 3.9 4.7 91.3 100.0 
Italy 50,810,452 2.0 7.2 90.8 100.0 
United 
Kingdom 48,720,576 5.6 6.6 87.8 100.0 
Belgium 8,477,923 8.6 3.8 87.6 100.0 
Germany 69,992,647 8.3 4.2 87.6 100.0 
Iceland 223,839 3.3 10.3 86.4 100.0 
Portugal 9,531,004 2.6 13.3 84.1 100.0 
Switzerland 5,969,867 18.2 4.4 77.4 100.0 
Austria 7,548,342 18.0 4.8 77.2 100.0 
Ireland 3,516,392 6.0 22.5 71.4 100.0 
Luxembourg 363,846 33.3 7.5 59.3 100.0 
      
 
Notes: Countries are ordered by size of resident nationals. Citizenship is defined as the sum of all 
nationals (in country and abroad) and all residents in the country (whether nationals or 
not). All figures exclude youngsters below 18 years of age. The interpretation of such 
figures must allow for bias caused by prisoners and mentally ill persons who, in some 
countries, are excluded from voting rights. New Zealand is excluded because of unreliable 
information. 
Sources: National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005). Because in the case of the Czech 
Republic and Spain the estimates have been unrealistically low, the share of expatriates is 
estimated as the deviation of the electorate from the national residents. 
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Table 2 presents some basic information about citizenship, defined as access to social 
rights, for our sample of 21 countries. Let us remind that we consider citizens all those who 
possess the nationality of the country (whether they live in the country or not) plus those who 
live in the country (whether they are nationals or not). It is interesting to see that there is a 
great deal of variation in the composition of citizenship in these countries. There are six 
countries which have a proportion of non-national residents (immigrants) between 5% and 
10% (United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, United States, Ireland and Sweden). There are 
two countries with much higher proportions: Austria and Switzerland (about 18%). And, 
finally, Luxembourg with 33% of non-national resident citizens (mostly due to European 
institutions and financial centres). For the remaining 12 countries, the proportion of non-
national residents is below 5%. Some variation exists also in the proportion of citizens who 
live abroad, that is national expatriates (emigrants). The large exception here is Ireland with 
22.5% of its citizens living overseas. Iceland and Portugal have a share of expatriates 
around 10–13%. Three countries have rates of nationals living abroad of 5–8% (Finland, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom). The remaining 14 countries have rates of 
expatriates of less than 5%. 
Table 3: Electorates in 21 OECD countries 
 
Country Citizenship Electorate Difference 
Difference 
(as % of 
total 
citizenship) 
     
Luxembourg 363,846 221,103 142,743 39.2 
Switzerland 5,969,867 4,628,782 1,341,085 22.5 
Austria 7,548,342 5,912,592 1,635,750 21.7 
Canada 25,326,533 21,243,473 4,083,060 16.1 
Ireland 3,516,392 3,002,173 514,219 14.6 
Australia 14,882,361 12,708,837 2,173,524 14.6 
Germany 69,992,647 61,432,868 8,559,779 12.2 
Belgium 8,477,923 7,570,637 907,286 10.7 
United Kingdom 48,720,576 44,403,238 4,317,338 8.9 
Denmark 4,361,200 3,998,957 362,243 8.3 
Netherlands 13,071,282 12,035,935 1,035,347 7.9 
United States 210,088,689 194,327,000 15,761,689 7.5 
Portugal 9,531,004 8,902,713 628,291 6.6 
Sweden 7,151,617 6,722,163 429,454 6.0 
Norway 3,564,658 3,358,856 205,802 5.8 
Iceland 223,839 211,289 12,550 5.6 
Japan 104,353,921 100,433,798 3,920,123 3.8 
Spain 34,355,265 33,045,318 1,309,947 3.8 
Italy 50,810,452 49,358,947 1,451,505 2.9 
Finland 4,335,367 4,220,951 114,416 2.6 
Czech Republic 8,413,143 8,264,484 148,659 1.8 
     
 
Notes: Countries are ordered by level of discrepancy as a percentage of citizenship. New Zealand is 
excluded because of missing information. 
Sources: National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005). 
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In Table 3 countries are ranked according to the degree of discrepancy between citizenship 
and electorates (last column). The simple indicator we use here is the percentage of citizens 
without voting rights, that is, those not included in the electorate. It is a measure of ―political 
exclusion‖: the larger the percentage, the more exclusive the franchise. On top of the table, 
Luxembourg stands out with nearly 40% of citizens – i.e. mostly non-national residents 
(immigrants) – excluded from voting rights. Table 4 below informs us about the composition 
of this excluded segments of the citizenship. Around 85% of the disenfranchised citizens in 
Luxembourg are immigrants and only 15% are nationals who expatriated. Two very similar 
cases are Austria and Switzerland. For the two Alpine cases, too, there is a large proportion 
of citizens who does not have the right to vote in federal elections (about 22% in both cases). 
This is one out of five citizens. As for Luxembourg, disenfranchised citizens are mostly 
(above 80% for both Austria and Switzerland) non-national residents.
19
 Additional similar 
cases are Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. For these countries we 
see a lower level of discrepancy, that is, exclusion. However, the composition of the 
excluded citizens is very similar to that of Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria, with more 
than 65% of the excluded citizens being immigrants.
20
 
Things look differently for Portugal and Ireland, as well as for Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Japan. Portugal does not have a very high rate of discrepancy (6.6%). It is only slightly 
higher for Denmark and the Netherlands (about 8%) while for Japan it is 3.8%. On the 
contrary, the rate is quite high for Ireland (14.6%). What these five cases have in common is 
that the proportion of citizens without voting rights are to a large extent national expatriates 
who lost the right to vote. The proportion of expatriates among the disenfranchised citizens is 
around 75% for Ireland, 60% for Portugal, and around 50% for Denmark and the 
Netherlands. Another country for which the proportion is high is Japan: above 70% of the 
discrepancy (which, however, is a small one) is due to national expatriates. This is explained 
by the very low immigration rates in Japan.
21
 
  
                                                     
19
 The same is true for Spain and the Czech Republic. Because in these cases the OECD estimates of the 
expatriate community have been unrealistically low, it has been estimated as the deviation of the electorate from 
the national residents. In reality, however, the share of expatriates without the right to vote is still somewhat higher 
implying that slightly less than 100% of the disenfranchised are immigrants. 
20
 Incomplete data sources do not allow us to comment on Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
21
 Other countries with a quite large segment of expatriates among the excluded citizens are Iceland, Italy, Finland 
and the United Kingdom. The proportion of emigrants in the segment of citizenship without voting rights is above 
30% for all these countries. 
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Table 4: Composition of discrepant electorates in 18 OECD countries 
 
Country 
Difference 
citizenship–
electorate 
Difference 
(as % of 
citizenship) 
Non-national 
residents 
(immigrants) 
Non-national 
residents 
(as % of 
difference) 
National 
expatriates 
(emigrants) 
Expatriates 
without vote 
Expatriates 
without vote 
(as % of 
difference) 
        
Luxembourg 142,743 39.2 121,058 84.8 27,164 21,685 15.2 
Switzerland 1,341,085 22.5 1,084,645 80.9 262,456 256,440 19.1 
Austria 1,635,750 21.7 1,357,388 83.0 366,024 278,362 17.0 
Ireland 514,219 14.6 211,742 41.2 792,316 385,000 74.9 
Germany 8,559,779 12.2 5,774,762 67.5 2,933,757 2,785,017 32.5 
Belgium 907,286 10.7 727,161 80.1 321,544 180,125 19.9 
Denmark 362,243 8.3 191,261 52.8 173,009 170,982 47.2 
Netherlands 1,035,347 7.9 515,156 49.8 616,909 520,191 50.2 
Portugal 628,291 6.6 244,526 38.9 1,268,726 383,765 61.1 
Sweden 429,454 6.0 386,977 90.1 206,604 42,477 9.9 
Norway 205,802 5.8 147,125 71.5 122,079 58,677 28.5 
Iceland 12,550 5.6 7,450 59.4 23,070 5,100 40.6 
United Kingdom 4,317,338 8.9 2,710,900 62.8 3,229,676 1,606,438 37.2 
Japan 3,920,123 3.8 1,121,446 28.6 575,992 2,798,677 71.4 
Spain 1,309,947 3.8 1,309,947 100.0 849,298 0 0.0 
Italy 1,451,505 2.9 1,003,451 69.1 3,649,377 448,054 30.9 
Finland 114,416 2.6 76,425 66.8 265,245 37,991 33.2 
Czech Republic 148,659 1.8 148,659 100.0 241,529 0 0,0 
        
 
Note: This table does not include the United States, Australia and Canada for which data on the composition of the discrepancy between citizenship and 
electorate is strongly influenced by registration rules which make the interpretation of data difficult. Data on the number of registered voters are not 
available. Furthermore, for the US special regulations in regard to prisoners further bias the figures. New Zealand is excluded because of unreliable data. 
For Spanish and Czech figures, see footnote 19. 
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These figures are summarised graphically in Figure 3. The level ―zero‖ indicates the number 
of voters as of official electoral registers. The four bars indicate deviations from the 
electorate. The white bars correspond to our definition of citizenship: all nationals (wherever 
they live) plus all those living in the country and paying taxes there (whatever their 
nationality). In some countries, such as Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria, there are 
many more citizens than voters. The striped bars show that in most cases there are more 
nationals than voters and, therefore, that there always are nationals without the right to vote 
(those living abroad). The dotted bars indicate that the number of nationals living in the 
country is usually only a part of the electorate, although a very large one obviously. Negative 
bars indicate here that the group of national residents is smaller than the electorate. This 
means that in these countries expatriates have the right to vote, with the exception of Ireland 
where the discrepancy between the share of national residents and the electorate is due to 
the voting rights of British nationals. The gray bars, finally, indicate that there are countries 
such as Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland (but also Germany) where the discrepancy 
between citizens and voters is caused by the exclusion of immigrants who do not have 
voting rights through the electoral law and who have a difficult access to nationality (and 
through that to voting rights). 
Figure 3: Citizenship and electorate in 18 OECD countries 
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In these cases we see very clearly the interaction at play between immigration flows and 
nationality (or naturalisation) laws. The largest discrepancies between citizenship and 
electorate exist in those cases in which large rates of immigration are combined with 
restrictive nationality laws. As seen above, this is the factor that really varies across 
countries. Whereas electoral laws hardly ever allow non-national residents to vote, 
naturalisation may or may not give access to voting rights. It is therefore the interaction 
between high rates of immigration and restrictive naturalisation laws that explain most of the 
cross-country variation of discrepancy between electorate and citizenship. The same cannot 
be said to the same extent for national expatriates. Here rates count, too, but as we have 
seen the variation in electoral laws (granting voting rights to emigrants) is small. 
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V.  Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the quality of representation does not only depend on the degree 
to which voters’ preferences are congruent with those of the representatives, but also on the 
degree to which citizens are included in the representation circuit. Based on a broad 
definition of citizenship we have shown that citizen–representative congruence cannot be 
equated with, and operationalised through, voter–representative congruence. The more or 
less large discrepancy between citizenship and electorate makes this one-to-one 
equivalence between citizenship and electorate problematic. The paper therefore questions 
the ―denominator‖, whether using electorates can replace citizenship. Our goal was to shift 
the discussion back to more fundamental problems of inclusion/exclusion, to which 
globalisation and the increasing geographical mobility of individuals gives new scope. 
Empirical results of the paper show that the main source of discrepancy between citizenship 
and electorate is the combination of high rates of non-national residents (immigrants) in 
countries in which naturalisation laws make it difficult to access nationality and thus voting 
rights. This large discrepancy is also not solved by electoral laws since these do usually not 
grant voting rights to non-nationals. Problems of representation are therefore strictly linked to 
conceptions of nationality – who is a member of the national community and who is not – 
and to conceptions of citizenship – who is a member of the political community and who is 
not. In principle, it would be possible to imagine changes in electoral laws granting voting 
rights to citizens without making them nationals. This would make it possible to include 
citizens in the political community without including them in the national community. It is an 
instrument that would solve normative conflicts about confusing definitions of who is a 
national and who is not. It would also solve problems of temporality, since electoral laws 
could make voting rights for non-nationals dependent upon residency. Non-national citizens 
vote as long as they live and pay taxes in a country, and lose the right as soon as they leave 
it. This paper, thus also points to normative implications for future research and policy 
making. 
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